

DFC - CMC - 18



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1611
Ser N00/384
9 SEP 2019

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT or (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) tr 1611 Ser 00/085 of 10 May 19

From (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS 832)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE IN CASE OF CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN

1. Forwarded, concurring with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recommendation that CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN, be detached for cause.
2. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) letter 1000 Ser 00/085 of 10 May 19 is incorrectly labeled as such. The (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) letter is hereby corrected to include the proper SSIC as 1611, vice 1000.
3. CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) FIRST ENDORSEMENT of 12 May 19 is not numbered. His endorsement is hereby corrected to reflect page 6.
4. SECOND ENDORSEMENT of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) letter 1000 Ser 00/120 of 10 Jun 19 is corrected to reflect the proper SSIC as 1611, vice 1000, and is hereby numbered as page 7.
5. THIRD ENDORSEMENT of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) letter 1000 Ser 00/076 of 18 Jun 19 is incorrectly labeled as page 9. It is hereby corrected to reflect page 8 and to contain the proper SSIC as 1611, vice 1000.
6. FOURTH ENDORSEMENT of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) letter 1616 Ser N02/034 of 1 Jul 19 is incorrectly labeled as page 10. It is hereby corrected to reflect page 9, and to contain the proper SSIC as 1611, vice 1000.
7. My point of contact in this matter is CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JAGC, USN, who may be reached at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or via e-mail at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Copy to:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

1616
Ser N02/034
1 Jul 19

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1000 Ser 00/085 of 10 May 19

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

To: Commander Navy Personnel Command (PERS-832)

Via: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. Forwarded. I concur with (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2. My point of contact for this matter is LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) JAGC, USN. He may
be reached at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) or (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) for any questions regarding this
matter.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Conv to:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1000
Ser 00/076
18 Jun 19

THIRD ENDORSEMENT or (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1000 Ser 00/085 of 10 May 19

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-832)

Via: (1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. Forwarded, recommending approval. The justification underpinning this request for Detachment for Cause is sufficient and over a length of time that demonstrates a pattern of substandard performance and decision making required of a Command Master Chief to influence culture in a positive manner.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Copy to:
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1000
Ser 00/120
10 Jun 19

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1000 Ser 00/085 of 10 May, 2019

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-832)
Via: (1) CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN
(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(3)
(4)

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Ref: (a) MILPERSMAN 1616-010
(b) CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr of 5 June, 2019

1. Forwarded, recommending Detachment for Cause.

2. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) initiated conversations with the Executive Officer and myself on 1 February, 2019, to discuss his personal life stressors and their potential to impact his ability to perform his duties as the Command Master Chief. I counseled Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that I thought his overall performance had been unsatisfactory up to that point in time and needed to improve significantly moving forward. Any request made by Command Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) requesting a Humanitarian Reassignment (HUMS) or Limited Duty (LIMDU) transfer would have been considered separately from my evaluation of his performance and ultimate decision to detach him for cause.

3. I need to correct a typographical mistake on my initial letter. On page 5, paragraph 5, the final sentence should read, "I have considered the context of both his injury and performance of duties in his 22 months onboard, and I do not believe that this injury and recovery were a direct contributing factor to his unsatisfactory performance." (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Copy to: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
CMDCM



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1000
Ser 00/085
10 May 19

From: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-832)
Via: (1) CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN
(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(3)
(4)
Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
Ref: (a) MILPERSMAN 1616-010

Encl: (1) NAVPERS 1616/27
(2) DEOCS Survey results dated 2 September, 2018
(3) Memo to Command Investigation Officer dated 10 December, 2018
(4) Member's acknowledgement of DFC request

1. Per reference (a), I request CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) be detached for cause from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) by reason of unsatisfactory performance of duty over an extended period of time.

2. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has been assigned to this command and has been performing duties as the Command Master Chief since (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2017.

3. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has demonstrated unsatisfactory performance of his duties and fails to meet my expectations of a Command Master Chief. He has lost my confidence to serve as a trusted senior advisor, does not effectively lead the Chief's Mess, and does not serve as a role model for our junior enlisted Sailors. Several instances of unprofessional behavior and his failure to follow direct orders has negatively impacted command morale. Command Culture Survey (DEOCS) results dated 2 September, 2018 (enclosure 2) highlight an unacceptable number of comments that bring into question CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) professionalism, effectiveness, and adherence to Navy Core Values. A Command Investigation initiated by (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) following a hotline complaint further identified Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) unprofessional behavior. Despite formal counseling and numerous informal counseling sessions, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) continues to fail to meet the standards of conduct and performance expected of a Command Master Chief. Incidents that demonstrate unsatisfactory performance include:

a. Unprofessional management in the case of ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). Following the 2017 promotion of the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) newest Chief Petty Officers, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) experienced a gap in the Admin Department Leading Petty Officer position that was projected to last 30 to 60 days. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) suggested to move a newly promoted Chief Petty Officer, ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) into this position. The previous Commanding Officer, with my support, did not support Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) recommendation and decided to keep ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in the intelligence division. Despite this clear guidance from the Commanding Officer, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) informed ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that she would serve as the acting Admin Chief. Either Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) gave this direction to ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) after receiving the Commanding Officer's guidance, or he had already 'promised' this position to ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and was unwilling to correct the decision after discussing the issue with the Commanding Officer. When the officer leadership was finally aware of this issue, the Commanding Officer directed Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to explain to ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the rest of the CPO

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Mess that he had mistakenly moved the new Chief into a position without approval from the Commanding Officer. However, he did not take responsibility for his mistake and elected to inform ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that she had been "fired" from her role as the Acting Admin Chief. His actions resulted in significant confusion that undermined the Commanding Officer's authority and created discord between the Command Triad and the CPO Mess. This incident also damaged the morale and performance of the senior Admin Petty Officers. Further, during this incident and over the proceeding months, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) exhibited unprofessional behavior towards ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) during written and verbal correspondence, resulting in what she described as "a toxic work environment." Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) failed to properly mentor, support and develop a new Chief Petty Officer.

b. Unprofessional execution of Disciplinary Review Boards (DRB). In one DRB, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) used racially derogatory terms that required Command Managed Equal Opportunity (CMEQ) intervention. During interviews with two Sailors of Mexican and Puerto Rican decent respectively, he spoke in broken Spanish slang in a highly unprofessional manner. In a second DRB, he shared sensitive legal proceedings with the entire Chief's Mess, instead of limiting the information to members of that DRB. He included personal comments introducing his own unsubstantiated assumptions that suggested the accused Sailor participated in sexual activity, which were neither pertinent to the facts of the case nor factual. His actions within the CPO Mess established an unjust and unfair view of the accused Sailor and required the dismissal of all formal charges. In a recent DRB, he failed to properly navigate an interrogation after statements made by a witness suggested that she was a victim of sexual assault. Further, he subsequently failed to promptly notify the Commanding Officer of this concern regarding a potential unrestricted report of a sexual assault. Although it was later determined that the relayed incident did not meet the threshold of a sexual assault, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) judgment and decision making during the interview was still troubling. Subsequently, I have lost faith that Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) can manage a fair and professional legal proceeding.

c. Failure to obey a lawful order by the Commanding Officer. I had directed Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to establish a Duty Chief Petty Officer on the watchbill to be available for any personnel incidents outside of normal working hours. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) failed to implement this guidance upon the squadron's return from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). After several personnel incidents over the next few months, the Commanding Officer again asked for the establishment of the Duty CPO. At the request of Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Commanding Officer waited until the watch instruction was edited to add this new watch requirement. When the Commanding Officer reviewed the watch instruction during the week of 11 March 2019, he gave a specific, lawful order to Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to establish the Duty CPO that week. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) failed to follow that order again and failed to message this guidance properly to the CPO Mess. The lack of a Duty CPO negatively impacted the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) response to a command Sailor's attempted suicide on (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2019; the member's division officer, the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) duty officer and I were all present at the hospital with the member, but there was no Chief Petty Officer there to provide critical support. When counseled regarding his failure to implement this watch, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) deflected responsibility and suggested that these types of policies would be best for the Commanding Officer to deliver personally to the Chief Petty Officers. He further articulated that although he acknowledged the direct guidance he was given, he willingly viewed the order as a 'suggestion' because my leadership style was more patient than our previous Commanding Officer. He has clearly taken advantage of my patience despite routine counseling and follow up on this issue, which undermines my authority and effectiveness as the Commanding Officer.

d. Several comments made during the DEOCS survey caused alarm about Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) support of the Navy's equal opportunity policies as it applies to minorities, women, and members of the LGBTQ community. Focus groups conducted by the Command Resiliency Team did not find specific evidence supporting discriminatory statements. When defending comments identified in the DEOCS survey, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has stated that he is not a racist; however, consideration must be paid to his

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

perceived biases/prejudices, whether known or unknown by him, and their accompanying impact on the command at large. It is possible that he is not a racist, but manages to make statements that are poorly articulated or without the necessary filter to ensure they are professional and constructive. However, my own observations do cause me concern:

1. In the fall of 2017, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) commented to me that many of his personal friends had informed him that a post he had made on social media appeared to be racist. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) did not disclose the actual post to me, but stated that it was not his intent to come across as racist. I counseled him that the way in which others observed his comments was just as important as his intentions, and encouraged him to remove the controversial post.

2. In the winter of 2017, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was involved in formal counseling of the Command Career Counselor following an incident of misconduct. After that counseling, the Command Career Counselor, an African American male, disclosed to me his opinions that the Command Master Chief was a racist and that he had routinely had unprofessional interactions with the Master Chief. The Command Career Counselor informed me that during a meeting with other First Class Petty Officers, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had once threatened to "shove ball caps down their throats." Because the Career Counselor had just been the subject of a misconduct investigation, I did not launch an investigation into these allegations. However, I did discuss these concerns with Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and directed him to develop a more professional working relationship with the Career Counselor and to be more aware of any sensitivities regarding the appearance of discrimination.

3. In December, 2018, a command Chief Petty Officer suffered a laceration on his face that was explained as a bathroom accident. I was aware that the Chief had (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I asked Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to pay attention to any further details of the story to ensure the Chief was not in any concerning domestic situation. He responded, "yeah, you never know with those types of people." The Chief Petty Officer in question is of Hispanic descent, and I was immediately concerned with Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) comment. I asked him what he meant by that, and he tried to talk back out of his comment. I immediately counseled him and explained that these types of comments were demonstrative of the concerns regarding whether or not Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) discriminates on the basis of racist, gender, or other identifiers.

e. A general pattern of poor execution of his administrative duties as the Command Master Chief. He routinely failed to meet deadlines for submission of Sailor recognition packages, Meritorious Advancement Program packages, and other administrative program requirements. Additionally, the quality of his written and verbal communication skills are well below the standards expected of a senior enlisted leader.

1. He was formally counseled in October 2018 regarding his poor management of Sailor recognition programs, specifically Sailor of the Quarter packages. In four successive quarters, packages were routed late providing insufficient time for the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer to properly review, edit, and forward the submissions. There was a complete lack of transparency in the Chief's selection process of Sailors of the Quarters, and Master Chief Morris was highly resistant to the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer's request for a more open and fair evaluation process. I gave specific guidance to Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to create a data-centric spreadsheet that allowed for objective reviews of each Sailor; Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was eventually able to provide this information, but only after several months of my persistence. The Sailor of the Quarter program is now objective and fair because of a full rewrite of the command's instruction, close monitor of its execution, and the assignment of a competent Chief Petty Officer to manage the process.

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2. I gave clear guidance to Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to provide the same level of detail in reviewing Meritorious Advancement Program (MAP) candidates, but he underperformed in his duties to consolidate inputs and implement a process to fairly review all Sailors eligible for consideration. He was unable to execute ranking boards and provide recommendations within the established timeline, resulting in the Commanding Officer receiving the nominations only two days before the deadline.

3. During the annual review of Command Program managers, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was primarily responsible for consolidating requests from personnel and matching the requests to available command programs. I gave him specific guidance to create a product that clearly captured names of individuals that had requested collateral duties and a list of all personnel currently assigned collateral duties so that I had visibility on which members were motivated to request additional responsibility in order to award collateral duties fairly. He failed to provide this level of detail for over a month. While he was on holiday leave, I assigned this task to a Senior Chief Petty Officer serving as the acting CMC, and he was able to create a useful product in less than 24 hours, demonstrating that my request was reasonable and extremely helpful.

4. He exhibited unprofessional and distracting behavior during the Commanding Officer's address to All Khakis following a recent suicide attempt. Specifically, during an emotionally charged discussion about suicide, he made a spectacle by emptying a bag of seasoned nuts directly onto the conference table next to me, ate the nuts, and then brushed the debris directly onto the floor. His actions were highly distracting, disrespectful, and undermined the tone with which All Khakis were presently engaged. Additionally, he routinely fails to pay attention during meetings, often introducing topics that had discussed moments prior.

4. I considered initiating Detachment for Cause proceedings immediately upon receiving the Command Culture Survey results early in my tour as the Commanding Officer. At the time, I viewed Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) performance as below average compared with my experiences with other Command Master Chiefs, including two CMCs I served with as the Executive Officer of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). However, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had not been provided formal counseling by the previous Commanding Officer, and I attribute a significant portion of the overall poor command climate to the leadership of the previous Commanding Officer. I decided to conduct formal counseling in October, 2018 in an attempt to realign Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and provide him an opportunity to become a more competent Command Master Chief. I was not provided with any feedback following the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) command investigation, and thus could not use this investigation to further document substandard performance. His performance has not improved sufficiently over the past 18 months, and his recent failure to follow my orders and continued unsatisfactory performance has had a negative impact on the effectiveness of the command and welfare of our Sailors.

It is my opinion that Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has failed to effectively lead the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Chief's Mess in large part because of his attitude and expectation of being treated as an outsider. He had not previously served in (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and has mentioned being an outsider on dozens of occasions during Triad discussions as well as during All Khaki meetings. Although it is common to have a Command Master Chief from a different community, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) routine focus on this fact has become a root cause of his failure to integrate with the other Chiefs; he has simply created his own barrier and excuse for poor performance in his duties. Following the DEOCS survey debrief in October of 2018, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has worked very hard to gain the trust and respect of the Chief's Mess; however, I believe his renewed desired to be liked and respected by his fellow Chiefs has become a liability. He chose to not follow my direct order regarding the duty CPO watch because he did not want to disappoint the Chiefs. On other occasions, he has pleaded with me to soften policies in order for him to "get a win" with the Chief's Mess. It is clear that he is unwilling and unable to enforce policies that he deems as unpopular, failing in his primary responsibility as a Command Master Chief.

Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

5. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) has failed to meet the high standards expected of a Command Master Chief, but he has faithfully served the Navy for (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). I know that his intentions are generally well placed and he does dedicate himself to the performance of his duties. Unfortunately, he is unable to execute the demanding duties as the Command Master Chief. In late November 2018, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) suffered (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) For the next 45 days, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was unable to fully perform his duties due to the lingering impact of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). In mid-January, 2019, Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) informed me that he was cleared for full duty by his medical provider and he resumed his full duties. I have considered the context of both his injury and performance of duties (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) months onboard, and I do not believe that this injury and recovery was not a direct contributing factor to his unsatisfactory performance.

6. Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) is very knowledgeable about command programs, dedicated to the Navy's mission and Sailors, and is capable of serving in the capacity as a Master Chief in his previous (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) rating. He has my recommendation for retention and reassignment.

7. I have given a copy of this request to Master Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) this date and, by enclosure (4), have informed him/her that the request may be filed in his/her official record. He was also informed by enclosure (4) that he has a right to submit a written statement. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), I have provided him with a total of 20 working days to complete his endorsement until 10 June, 2019.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Copy to: (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

12 MAY 19

FIRST ENDORSEMENT of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) ltr 1000 Ser 00/085 of 10 May, 2019

From: CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-832)
Via: (1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Enc 1 (1) CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) letter dated 5 Jul 19
Subj: DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

1. I have received the letter requesting my detachment for cause and I understand the request may be filed in my official record.
2. I am aware of the contents of MILPERSMAN 1070-080 and I ~~(do)~~/do not desire to make a written statement (if a written statement is submitted, it should be attached to this endorsement).
3. I further understand that I have 20 working days from this date, until 10 June, 2019, to submit my statement. If I make such election and then fail to submit a statement in that period of time, it will be treated as a waiver of that right. I understand that any statement I make must be couched in temperate language, be confined to the pertinent facts, and not impugn the motives of others or make countercharges.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Signature

5 June 19

From: CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) USN
To: Commander, Navy Personnel Command (PERS-832)
Via: (1) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Subj: STATEMENT IN REGARDS TO DETACHMENT FOR CAUSE (DFC) ICO CMDCM (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Ref: (a) MIL PERMAN 1616-010
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Letter for DFC
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

Encl: (1) Letter from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(2) Letter from (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Doctor
(3) Awareness Fact Sheet

1. There are supplementary concerns within the "chronology of events," per ref (a). Those are: my (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) suffered on the last day of November 2018 (mentioned in ref (b)), the death of a Chief Petty Officer and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (mentioned in enclosure (1) of ref (b)), in conjunction with my (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c) There was also an e-mail in early Feb 2019, with a follow-up discussion between the Commanding Officer (CO), Executive Officer (XO) and I regarding possibilities if warranted, of Humanitarian Reassignment (HUMS); (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and Limited Duty (LIMDU) for myself. The context of these items each fell at a different time period and peak within the last seven months of my performance of duties.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
a. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(1) November 30, 2018 I had a collision with a Junior Sailor, ended up passing out, and was eventually taken to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) Emergency Room (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(2) Given the question that was asked by CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) via e-mail, five days after the news of the DFC and two days after the delivery of ref (b) about whether (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was a "contributing factor to my performance of duties over the last few months," I have no way of knowing that. I have attached enclosures from doctors listing diagnosis and symptoms. Neither they nor I can say what may have been "contributing." Enclosure (c) is also included with the doctor's letters, and a copy was given to the CO and XO one of the first times I returned to work in December for modified days. This fact sheet talks about "common symptoms" (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

b. The death of one of our Chiefs and subsequent murder of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(1) In March 2018, one of our Chiefs was sent home early from deployment due to several irregular medical symptoms. Upon returning to San Diego, he was diagnosed (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) to the shock of the entire Chiefs' Mess, along with many of the command's Officers and Junior Enlisted. Over the next 11 months, the command would watch, as the Chief and his family still invitingly participated in command events as able, even once he was categorized into a LIMDU status within a few months of 2018 deployment's end.

(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) the Chief passed away. From the time of his death, and through (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) tragic murder four days later, I overlapped (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and decent services, to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) provide support to the two living dependents, from the time of the Chief's passing, through the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and well through the time of the memorial service held for both of them, acting as a focal point for notifying Shipmates, community, friends and family of multiple fund raisers held for the family.

(3) I place this item because of the question of command morale in reference (b). It was a brutal morale impacting event to sustain within our command, and the toughest I have ever faced as a leader on the behalf of Enlisted Sailors in my (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) of being a Chief. I have worn Anchors for over (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) years of Service. There is no other Mess (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) have been a part of, that has become this unified and stood resilient through everything we have encountered.

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(1) When my application was submitted for the Command Master Chief (CMC) program three years ago, my spouse and I knew what our roles would be. I understood my responsibilities would increase (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(2) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

d. (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

2. I am aware of all listed events and concerns from ref (b), to include all its enclosures.

a. ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(1) Between the end of 2017 Chief's Season (when Chief (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) made Chief), all the way through to (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) in October 2018, ADMIN Department would be without a rated (YN or PS) Chief. To the confusion of ISC (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and the PS1 assigned (by CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CO and XO at that time) to be the Chief of ADMIN Department, I did let ISC know that I would still like an institutional expert from the Chiefs' Mess to check on ADMIN. I told ISC to be a mentor to the Sailors in ADMIN Department, and particularly help liaison any institutional necessities for the First Classes, and more specific to PS1. I believe each of us in the TRIAD became confused for several reasons. (a) ISC's initials started showing up on various routing folders in ADMIN, as the LCPO. (b) With a representative from the CPO Mess consistently checking on ADMIN Department, (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) was keeping me up-to-speed on all ADMIN matters. (c) It was directed to me by CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that PS1 would be allowed to come to All Khaki Meetings.

(2) In the middle of the 2018 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) pulled CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) all ADMIN Department Leadership, and I together to clarify that ISC was to formally be the ADMIN Department Chief in all aspects. About the same time, another (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CMC told me he was preparing to sit-down with one of his male CPO's to talk about rumors of our ISC and his Chief (is/was married) possibly having an affair. I asked him for the opportunity to talk with my Chain and ISC before he went to his Chief, and he concurred. I sat down with ISC, following advisement from CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) prior to our conversation. I let her know that if it was happening or not, the Chain of Command was here to support her. I did inform, "if it is something that is true, cease and desist." (This point had been made to me by CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), prior to my talk with her). From that point, she became very outraged, as I let her know again that we are here to support her. The other (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CMC was in the office area when this conversation took place. Although our TRIAD was aware of having this conversation with ISC, I clearly believe this was the point where toxicity between ISC and I began.

(3) While underway during (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (with the current CO and XO) I sent an extremely scathing e-mail to ISC about the need for her to be in ADMIN more. I still regret this. Although I viewed her performance as slightly below standards as a Chief, I understand the contextual view of me by the CO, with ties to the e-mail,

counseling, and 2018 DEOCS. By not having a clear-cut LCPO during this time, ADMIN Sailors suffered in advancement results, and moreover with no SOQ nominations in three of four categories, for three continual quarters.

b. Disciplinary Review Boards and Discriminatory Practices.

(1) The remarks said at a DRB called to be racist in reference (b), were talking in Spanish to one Sailor of Puerto Rican ethnicity and calling another Sailor a Filipino Islander, when to my then lack of knowledge he is Mexican. Following both cases, I was pulled to the side by the CMEO and told that it needed to be addressed. I discussed each matter with the former CO and XO, the Sailors themselves. I reported back to the CO, XO and CMEO that the issue was resolved. Neither Sailor harbored ill will. While the statements in a foreign language can be considered to be outside of the bounds of Navy regulation, neither event is racist.

(2) I do not recall specific remarks of "you never know with those types of people," being said in regards to the Chief who suffered lacerations on his face. The same as the CO, I knew the Chief had a (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). I talked about the Chief's past performance when he was a First Class, how he was counseled for going to an inappropriate website on a government computer, in addition to continual counsel on needing a haircut, all during our 2018 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). Outside of conversation, this Chief was our previous Senior (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) 2017, which I have a lot of hands-on time with his personal board preparation, and structuring of his package. He successfully ran (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) further stepping up as a new Chief in 2018 to run that same division for four months when the primary Chief was injured. Recently, the Chief was selected to be an (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). I have been his strongest advocate in each of these areas.

(3) In regards to being perceived as harboring bad intent toward LGBTQ Sailors or society, there was one incident where I was counseled by the XO on the use of a derogatory college sports rivalry term, used toward a university mascot to which an officer in the room was an alumnus. No maliciousness was intended toward the LGBTQ community. I have constantly been a direct advocate, supportive of several LGBTQ Sailors that I am aware of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

(4) The comments from October 2017, of our career counselor calling me a racist were following an issue of his own misconduct. Coinciding with a NPLOC he was given by the former CO, he was asked to write an essay to the Command TRIAD about his misbehavior. Within that, he accused me of being a racist. These allegations were unfounded, as NC1 and I would both discover, having several mutually respectful follow-on conversations. Over the next couple months and beyond, we defined expectations, talked life disciplines, and putting the careers of our command's Sailors first. This built into our most recent calendar year of winning the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) award for 2018; even having been deployed for most of that year, and given numerous changes to the Navy's advancement and reenlistment programs in the last two years.

(5) The Fall of 2017 social media post referred to was not racist, though I did discuss it with CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c). It was a statement disparaging racism given the recent events of Charlottesville, VA. There were politically and somewhat racially construed comments made by a few people in my post, which were deleted as I saw them on the post. I spoke to each individual privately who countered with such comments. I was extremely appreciative of CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) advisement.

(6) The failure to immediately report to the CO and XO, and stop the DRB where assault could have been mentioned, is what I have been most critical of myself in this DFC process. Her Chief stopped her amidst all the Chiefs in the DRB when the words started being mentioned by her, to deescalate the situation. Although the DRB was almost over, the better corrective action could have been to stop the DRB, immediately grab one of the two female CPOs in the DRB, and go talk and seek out services. About an hour after securing from the DRB, and when most all Command members (less Night Check) were on their way home, I contacted her Chief to check on her. The Chief had talked to her following the DRB, and prior to our call. He said that her boyfriend (different than the primary accused of that legal case) was going to be with her, and she would be fine. The next day, when I arrived at work, I immediately reached out to call our command's SARC, with overlapping communications with the CO and XO. I got specific advisement from the CO and XO, and brought her to my office to get on the phone with the SARC. Within 10 minutes, she and I were walking to Fleet and Family for her to meet with the SARC.

c. The Chiefs' Mess.

(1) I concur with CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) that in the beginning of my time at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) getting to know an (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) community Chiefs' Mess was (in my words) a culture shock. I am certain I said something to the effect of what he mentioned at an All Khaki Meeting (AKM) per reference (b). But on that occasion, it was a sympathetic and thankful remark. To transition, I listed the death of a Chief in our Mess and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) because I have felt that the Chiefs' Mess had been coming to a better understanding of all our responsibilities within the Mess, including their understanding of my being their leader as the Command Master Chief. Calling one another Chief, Senior Chief, Master Chief, "Rating" Chief, etc. had been common practice on the Deckplates since at least October of 2018 when I was counseled. There are two noteworthy items to mention that happened within the two weeks before reference (b) was delivered to me.

(a) The CPO Training Team visited the Command within three weeks of the DFC. Although I do not know what the CO's debrief was from the training team, I know that I was told by the two CMCs of the Training Team that the morale of the Command and leadership by the CPO Mess was trending upward.

(b) At the same time, results for a more recent DEOCS came in. The Command had 90% participation (including most of the CPO Mess), yielding around a 20% increase in the Senior Enlisted's "trust in leadership;" compared to the previous DEOCS. I didn't take the recent survey because I wanted complete transparency, given the comments about me in the previous survey.

(2) *Chief of the Watch*. Continuity increased when we slated a new Senior Watch Officer (SWO) and Senior Enlisted Watch Coordinator (SEWC) between Summer and Fall of 2018. They would start reviewing and rewriting our command watch bill instruction in Fall 2018; previous and current TRIAD had been asking for this from one previous SWO and two previous SEWCs.

(a) Regarding the 14 April 2019 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I discussed the matter over the phone, while he was in route back from visiting the command detachment that was in (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) at the time, and I was on leave in (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) area. I let him know that the Division Chief of the Sailor involved in the attempt had contacted me, and said he would be there if he could, but he was in the (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) area on leave. That Chief offered that he had already spoken with his Division Officer and knew the Officer was going to be there. I offered to go in myself, which CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) let me know not to come, because there would be enough support at the hospital. Having a *Chief of the Watch* at an earlier time frame could have been beneficial to the command, assisting with emerging Sailor situations.

(b) 24 January 2019, I sent an e-mail to the CO and XO regarding two courses of action (COAs) for *Chiefs of the Watch*. The SEWC and I had been working on this for about two months. A month later and just following CMC's corrections to the new watchbill instruction, one of ADMIN Department's junior YN's corrected an illegitimate and different working copy of the instruction, and forwarded it to the XO. I had forwarded the two COAs to the YN to insert in the working copy that would go to the XO and then the CO. Those COAs were left out of the copy that the XO did his revisions on. When the XO got back with me to see if anything was missing, we discovered that the YN had given him a bad copy. I then noticed the YN had failed to put either COA for Chiefs' watches in the instruction. Many reasons were listed for these recommended CPO watch COAs: (1) As the CMC, I could make phone calls and visits to Sailors in emergency situations, representing the CPO Mess during the work week; (2) there would soon be twice as many Junior Officers (SDOs) as Chiefs; (3) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) concerns at the command along with, (4) multiple positive urinalysis hits within a few particular weeks, strained the need for a *Chief of the Watch*.

d. Sailors of the Quarter (SOQ), the Meritorious Advancement Program (MAP) and Collateral Duties

(1) The most recent Sailor of the Quarter command instruction had administrative changes between two Triads around last year's change of command time-frame. It is the only command instruction regarding local SOQ practices, but was built to coincide with both (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) instructions. Once the winners in each category are confirmed by the CO, they are reformatted with minor corrects into ISIC format. Command Recognition Program Coordinators (Chief who assists with SOY/SOQ command program) turned over near the end of 2018.

With the First Quarter of FY-19, I worked with the new coordinator with data points, while he created a numerical spreadsheet that would automatically tabulate scores in each designated category of our local instruction's gradesheet enclosure. After showing it to me, I directed him to send this new spreadsheet from that quarter's boards to the CO and XO; results pending CO's approval. This was an improvement, which the CO had been asking about. I always kept all copies of grade sheets and many of the packages in my desk, since my arrival at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

About six months after CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and my arrival (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) received its first ISIC awarded SOQ in over two years. Since then, we have had three more (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) SOQ winners in three of the four SOQ categories, our most recent being the Senior Sailor of the Quarter, First Quarter, FY-19.

(2) The MAP and its data collection have dramatically improved over each cycle in two years. From the former TRIAD to current, we progressed from simplistically charting out the top half of candidates in each category, to adding previous test scores, primary duties, qualifications and collaterals. For the first half of the current MAP season the Navy is in, we utilized our first fully listed charts by alpha roster of the Command. Fast forward to the current version which was a spreadsheet that was scheduled to be used May 16, 2019 (just following my DFC notification) by the Chiefs for rankings for second half of the current MAP cycle. This chart included, for every First Class Petty Officer and below: last eval data, current eval data, previous two advancement scores, PRD, evals left onboard, report date, warfares achieved, time in rate, last two PFA's, primary job, command collaterals, qualifications and significant accomplishments. I had worked on that current version with the Maintenance Officer and a couple of the Chiefs. The XO, Department Heads, and Chiefs Mess had each been advised in notes, DH meetings and perspective Chiefs' meetings. It was to be utilized as a continually rotating roster for each pay scale, as people check into and out of the Command for all future periodic EVAL and MAP rankings.

(3) When CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and I arrive at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) collateral duties had no administrative organizational fashion to them. The *mushroom* formatted sheet I had been passed down, did not even have half of the Navy SORM and OPNAV required Navy collaterals, and lacked many of the ones held locally throughout the Navy. It appeared to have been about two years since (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) had updated a *Primary and Secondary Duties 1301*, in accordance with doctrine and the appropriate Navy Correspondence Manual format. I assisted the former TRIAD in filling all spots, to include the former CO getting a signed copy out to the command prior to change of command. As that was ongoing, I developed a working copy and notified Senior Enlisted Leaders when turnovers were to be done, soliciting inputs. Prior to October 2018 (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) due to recent SCPO/CPO evaluations and upcoming FCPO evaluations, it was time to do an annual rotation of command collaterals. I constructed an e-mail, listing all collaterals, with scope, involvement, and rank/grade to serve in those positions. During the month-plus of (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) detachment, I received multiple inputs for all collaterals. I tracked each name, written down on a print out of the initial e-mail I had sent. A Senior Chief was also assisting me with tracking it via a working copy of a 1301, color coded with the soon-to-be former collateral holders, and blank spots for would-be leaders. I do not recall when CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) initially asked for the list of collaterals in a particular format. I had all the previous mentioned data, and more. I was in the process of getting in contact with the SCPO filling in as CMC. I gave him all the documentation. Afterwards, he put together a spread sheet approved by the CO.

3. Conclusion.

a. I respect CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) decision, and know he probably meditated on this for some time. I believe he fully understands, ref (a) word-for-word, "A DFC is one of the strongest administrative measures used and should only be requested when all other efforts are exhausted." No Command Senior Enlisted Leader ever sets out to get DFC'd. I did not. I still have the Enlisted Sailors in mind at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) today, with Advancements that just came out, and qualifications throughout the Deckplates that have been abounding.

b. I understand the concerns of not meeting "the expectations of a Command Master Chief." But with this DFC recommendation, everything has not been in vein, nor does it reflect the current status of the Command, where all Sailors were still my highest concern. Every matter brought to my attention, reciprocated corrective actions, thereby causing morale to trend in a positive direction. As mentioned, I take full responsibility for *Chief of the Watch*, and the particular DRB which wound up not being a sexual assault case. Yet, at no time has my thought and intent ever been against the Sailors. With keen awareness, I have been shoulder-to-shoulder with many of our Sailors, from walks to Fleet and Family, drop offs and discharges from the hospital, pulling Sailors to the side in recognition that *something is going on*, and have devoted more rigid hours at work to be able to communicate with multiple shifts of Sailors at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

c. It has always been my intention to do the best for the entire command as it's Senior Enlisted Leader. I sincerely hope consideration is given to all the facts above. The strain of repetitiveness in many outdated disciplinary item (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) and work/life balance, along with losing a Chief Petty Officer at one's Command, cannot be understated. This command's Sailors have been hitting on all cylinders for quite some time. Since the day I arrived at (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) through my recent detachment, every Sailor in the Command is and has provided (b)(6), (b)(7)(c) (b)(6), (b)(7)(c)

